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ABSTRACT 
  The coronavirus pandemic caused an unprecedented shutdown of 
the United States. The stay-at-home orders issued by most states 
typically banned large gatherings of any kind, including religious 
services. Churches sued, arguing that these bans violated their religious 
liberty rights by treating worship services more strictly than analogous 
activities that were not banned, such as shopping at a liquor store or 
superstore. This Essay examines these claims, concluding that the 
constitutionality of the bans turns on the science of how the pathogen 
spreads, and that the best available scientific evidence supports the mass 
gathering bans.  
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INTRODUCTION 
We are facing an unprecedented public health crisis. The dangers 
of the pandemic cannot be overstated: medical researchers are still 
struggling to devise an effective treatment, and a vaccine is still months 
away. Meanwhile, the number of people testing positive for the novel 
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coronavirus in the United States reaches into the millions,1 with tens of 
thousands dying from complications associated with Covid-19, the 
disease caused by the virus.2 To stem the spread of the highly 
contagious pathogen, much of the country shut down for at least a 
month in April 2020, with the vast majority of governors ordering 
people to stay at home as much as possible.3 Unless essential, workers 
found themselves unemployed or working remotely.4 Rather than 
attend school, students were at home logging into online classes.5  
The emergency regulations usually included a ban on large 
gatherings. For example, Virginia barred in-person gatherings of more 
than ten people, and its illustrative list of affected public spaces 
included schools, restaurants, food courts, bars, theatres, concert halls, 
museums, fitness centers, indoor sports facilities, beauty salons, 
bowling alleys, skating rinks, escape rooms, “other places of indoor 
public amusement,” and, relevant here, houses of worship.6 Most states 
 
 1.  According to Johns Hopkins’s Covid-19 Dashboard, the number of people testing 
positive has increased exponentially: By March 1, 2020, 30 people had tested positive; by April 1, 
the number increased to approximately 214,205; by May 1 it was 1.1 million; by June 1, 1.8 million; 
by July 1, 2.7 million; and by August 1, 4.6 million. Covid-19 Dashboard, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., 
CORONAVIRUS RES. CTR., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/us-map [https://perma.cc/ASR4-G6D8] 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2020).  
 2.  At least 100,000 people had died by mid-May of 2020. David Welna, ‘We All Feel At 
Risk’: 100,000 People Dead from COVID-19 in the U.S., NPR (May 27, 2020, 5:50 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/05/27/860508864/we-all-feel-at-risk-100-000-people-dead-from-covid-
19-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/G44F-24QE]. By mid-August, the death rate in the U.S. had 
increased to over 170,000. Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html [https://perma.cc/3VR8-
Q8X9] (last visited Aug. 21, 2020).  
 3.  See Jiachuan Wu, Savannah Smith, Mansee Khurana, Corky Siemaszko & Brianna 
DeJesus-Banos, Stay-At-Home Orders Across the Country: What Each State is Doing – Or Not 
Doing – Amid Widespread Coronavirus Lockdowns, NBC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/here-are-stay-home-orders-across-country-
n1168736 [https://perma.cc/NX52-W32W]. Some states started earlier, and some extended 
beyond April. See id. 
 4.  Tony Romm, Americans Have Filed More Than 40 Million Jobless Claims in Past 10 
Weeks, as Another 2.1 Million Filed for Benefits Last Week, WASH. POST (May 28, 2020, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/28/unemployment-claims-coronavirus 
[https://perma.cc/BK55-9FEX].  
 5.  Map: Coronavirus and School Closures, EDUC. WK. (May 15, 2020), 
https://www.edweek.org/ew/section/multimedia/map-coronavirus-and-school-closures.html 
[https://perma.cc/6A7W-K46W]. 
 6.  As the Eastern District of Virginia noted in Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 
Virginia’s regulation banned crowds of ten or more at schools, churches, and indoor spots 
including, 
all dining and congregation areas in restaurants, dining establishments, food courts, 
breweries, microbreweries, distilleries, wineries, tasting rooms, and farmers 
markets . . . “all public access to recreational and entertainment businesses” including 
“[t]heaters, performing arts centers, concert venues, museums, and other indoor 
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had enacted equally comprehensive bans,7 and this Essay’s analysis 
presumes a ban similar to Virginia’s. 
Even as states began to reopen in the summer, many continued to 
prohibit large gatherings.8 And with the resulting surges of cases in 
parts of the United States, some states are moving towards reimposing 
strict lock-down measures. California, for example, had reinstated a 
ban on indoor gatherings, including worship services, in many of its 
counties.9  
Although some states always exempted worship services from 
their bans, others have not.10 Exemptions, however, undermine public 
health and safety. Many researchers now believe that super-spreader 
events are the main means by which Covid-19 is spread; one study 
found that roughly 20 percent of Covid-19 cases—“all of them 
involving social gatherings”—lead to 80 percent of transmissions.11 As 
a result, it has become more important than ever to try and curtail these 
high risk gatherings. Unfortunately, worship services are among these 
high risk activities, with multiple coronavirus outbreaks traced to 
religious gatherings.12 These outbreaks endanger not only those who 
 
entertainment centers; [f]itness centers, gymnasiums, recreation centers, indoor sports 
facilities, and indoor exercise facilities; [b]eauty salons, barbershops, spas, massage 
parlors, tanning salons, tattoo shops . . . ; [r]acetracks and historic horse racing facilities; 
and [b]owling alleys, skating rinks, arcades, amusement parks, trampoline parks, fairs, 
arts and craft facilities, aquariums, zoos, escape rooms, indoor shooting ranges, public 
and private social clubs, and all other places of indoor public amusement. 
Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, No. 2:20cv204, 2020 WL 2110416, at *2 (E.D. Va. May 
1, 2020).  
 7.  See, e.g., Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, No. 3:20-cv-278-DJH, 2020 WL 
1909616, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 18, 2020) (banning “[a]ll mass gatherings,” defined as “any event 
or convening that brings together groups of individuals” including “community, civic, public, 
leisure, faith-based, or sporting events; parades; concerts; festivals; conventions; fundraisers; and 
similar activities”).  
 8.  Rachel Treisman, West: Coronavirus-Related Restrictions by State, NPR (July 2, 2020, 
4:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/01/847416108/west-coronavirus-related-restrictions-by-
state [https://perma.cc/SMA2-C3SZ]. 
 9.  As of July 13, dine-in restaurants, bars, wineries, movie theatres, family entertainment 
centers, and museums are shut down statewide. Hard-hit counties must also close their indoor 
gyms, personal care services, shopping malls, “[o]ffices for non-critical infrastructure sectors,” 
and places of worship. County Data Monitoring, CA.GOV, https://covid19.ca.gov/roadmap-
counties [https://perma.cc/PDJ2-D77L] (last visited Aug. 21, 2020). 
 10.  See Wu et al., supra note 3. 
 11.  Dillon C. Adams & Benjamin J. Cowling, Just Stop the Superspreading, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 2, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2MnY6be [https://perma.cc/JSD2-QM9A]; Christie Aschwanden, 
How ‘Superspreading’ Events Drive Most COVID-19 Spread, SCI. AM. (June 23, 2020), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-superspreading-events-drive-most-covid-19-
spread1 [https://perma.cc/E2SL-CSAZ] (noting research suggests 10–20 percent of infected 
people at super-spreader events are responsible for 80 percent of transmissions). 
 12.  See infra notes 125–128 and accompanying text (describing church outbreaks). 
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attend the services, but anyone the church attendees later come into 
contact with.13  
Nevertheless, several churches have argued that these orders 
violate their constitutionally protected right to religious liberty. A 
flurry of lawsuits are working their way through the courts, with mixed 
results.14 The Supreme Court recently weighed in with South Bay 
United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom,15 in which the Court denied an 
injunction against California’s modified restrictions established in May 
2020.16 This Essay examines whether mass gathering bans violate the 
free exercise of religion protected by the U.S. Constitution. It 
concludes that they probably do not, with the answer often turning on 
what activities are considered comparable to in-person worship in 
terms of the risk of contagion.  
Part I of this Essay discusses the standard of review. Although a 
few courts have argued that in times of emergency, a more deferential 
approach controls, concern for constitutional rights counsels that the 
standard Free Exercise Clause doctrine should apply. That doctrine 
requires that a challenged law is first assessed for neutrality and general 
applicability, and if it does not satisfy both of those requirements, the 
law is subject to strict scrutiny. Part II applies that doctrine and 
examines whether state regimes that ban mass gatherings but allow 
exceptions for essential services are neutral and generally applicable. 
 
 13.  See infra notes 126–128 and accompanying text (describing CDC study of outbreaks 
traced to religious services); see also Ariana Eunjung Cha, ‘Superspreading’ Events, Triggered by 
People Who May Not Even Know They Are Infected, Propel Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH. POST 
(July 18, 2020, 1:58 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/07/18/coronavirus-
superspreading-events-drive-pandemic [https://perma.cc/6L7X-QHCZ] (reporting how one 
super-spreader event infected 144 people at the event and another 43 people across sixteen 
different counties who were not present).  
 14.  See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) 
(denying request for injunctive relief); Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2020) 
(granting request for injunctive relief pending appeal); Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. 
Pritzker, No. 20-1811, 2020 WL 2517093, at *1 (7th Cir. May 16, 2020) (denying request for 
injunctive relief pending appeal).  
 15.  S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020). 
 16.  Id. at 1613 (“The application for injunctive relief presented to Justice K[agan] and by 
her referred to the Court is denied.”). The Executive Order still banned mass gatherings but made 
a limited exception for houses of worship, who were allowed to fill their buildings to 25 percent 
capacity with a maximum of 100 attendees. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The Court similarly 
denied an injunction against Nevada’s restrictions in July 2020. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. 
Sisolak, No. 19A1070, 2020 WL 4251360 (U.S. July 24, 2020) (mem.). The Nevada Governor Steve 
Sisolak signed an order which allowed certain facilities—including casinos—to operate at 50 
percent of their fire-code capacity, while religious facilities (like other permitted public 
gatherings) were required to cap their attendance at 50 persons. Id. at *3 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
Without an opinion from any Justice in the majority, it is difficult to parse their reasoning in this 
much more difficult case.  
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It argues that our evolving scientific knowledge about the pathogen 
very much informs what activities ought to be deemed analogous or 
not. More specifically, worship services may become super-spreader 
events in a way that shopping trips do not. Part III then applies strict 
scrutiny.  
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Courts generally do not second-guess legislative judgments. 
Consequently, when they are challenged, courts usually review them 
deferentially. However, a law that infringes on a constitutional right 
will be subject to heightened scrutiny. Laws subject to the highest level 
of scrutiny, known as strict scrutiny, are unconstitutional unless the 
government can show that the law is the only way to accomplish a truly 
compelling government goal.17 Although religious liberty challenges—
where the claim is that the government has hampered someone’s 
ability to practice their religion18—may trigger strict scrutiny, they do 
not always.  
Free exercise doctrine has undergone several shifts. At one point, 
under the Sherbert v. Verner test,19 named after the 1963 case that 
established it, any law that substantially burdened someone’s religious 
exercise was subject to strict scrutiny.20 If the law passed this rigorous 
review, it was constitutional. If the law failed, however, it was 
 
 17.  Cf. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2260 (2020) (“To satisfy [strict 
scrutiny], government action must advance interests of the highest order and must be narrowly 
tailored in pursuit of those interests.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).  
 18.  The First Amendment contains two religion clauses: the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause. The Establishment Clause prevents the government from favoring religion 
or favoring one religion over others. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). It would, for example, bar the government from 
declaring Christianity the official state religion or directly funding churches. The Free Exercise 
Clause, on the other hand, protects the right of individuals to practice their faith. Emp. Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). It would, for example, ban the government from outlawing 
Christianity, or banning churches.  
 19.  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 20.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (“A regulation neutral on its face may, in 
its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if 
it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.” (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398). Not all burdens on 
religion result in a free exercise exemption under the Sherbert v. Verner test. The burden may not 
be deemed substantial. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986) (“The Federal Government’s use 
of a Social Security number for Little Bird of the Snow does not itself in any degree impair Roy’s 
‘freedom to believe, express, and exercise’ his religion.”). Or even if substantial, the law that 
imposed it may nonetheless pass strict scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 
(1982) (“The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to 
accomplish an overriding governmental interest.”).  
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unconstitutional as applied and those challenging it were entitled to a 
religious liberty exemption from it.  
However, in 1990, the Supreme Court changed the constitutional 
doctrine in Employment Division v. Smith.21 Ever since Smith, state 
regulations that are neutral and generally applicable do not violate the 
Free Exercise Clause, even if they do limit people’s ability to practice 
their religion.22 Only if a law is not “neutral and generally applicable” 
is it subject to strict scrutiny. In Smith, for example, members of a 
Native American church challenged Oregon’s drug law which banned 
the peyote needed to fulfill a sacramental ritual.23 Once the Supreme 
Court concluded that the law was neutral and generally applicable, 
however, the members had no right to a Free Exercise Clause 
exemption.24  
In sum, under current constitutional doctrine, the first question is 
whether the challenged law is neutral and generally applicable. If it is, 
the law is constitutional and the analysis ends. No free exercise 
exemption is required. If the challenged law is not both neutral and 
generally applicable, then the Sherbert v. Verner test applies, where the 
government still prevails if the law satisfies strict scrutiny.25 
Some courts faced with religious liberty challenges to Covid-19 
mass gathering bans have eschewed traditional constitutional analysis, 
arguing that emergency circumstances call for more deferential 
review.26 In particular, several courts have cited to Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts,27 a 1905 Supreme Court case rejecting a constitutional 
challenge to mandatory vaccination during a smallpox epidemic.28 
 
 21.  Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 22.  Id. at 879 (“[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation 
to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability . . . .’” (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 
263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring)).  
 23.  Id. at 874.  
 24.  Id. at 882. 
 25.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 
(1993) (“A law failing to satisfy these [neutral and generally applicable] requirements must be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that 
interest.”). 
 26.  See, e.g., Antietam Battlefield KOA v. Hogan, No. CCB-20-1130, 2020 WL 2556496, at 
*5 (D. Md. May 20, 2020); Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, No. 20 C 2782, 2020 
WL 2468194, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2020), aff’d, 962 F.3d 341 (7th Cir. 2020); Calvary Chapel 
of Bangor v. Mills, No. 1:20-cv-00156-NT, 2020 WL 2310913, at *7 (D. Me. May 9, 2020); Cross 
Culture Christian Ctr. v. Newsom, No. 2:20-cv-00832-JAM-CKD, 2020 WL 2121111, at *3–4 (E.D. 
Cal. May 5, 2020); Cassell v. Snyders, No. 20 C 50153, 2020 WL 2112374, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 
2020). 
 27.  Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 28.  Id. at 38–39. 
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Writing that “a community has the right to protect itself against an 
epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members,”29 the 
Jacobson Court emphasized that no constitutional right was absolute,30 
and that individual liberty does not extend to harming others.31  
According to these lower courts, the Jacobson Court applied a 
two-part standard in evaluating restrictions during a public health crisis 
like the current pandemic: “[C]ourts only overturn rules that lack a 
‘real or substantial relation to [public health]’ or that amount to ‘plain, 
palpable invasion[s] of rights.’”32 Religious objectors, these courts 
uniformly found, failed to make the necessary showing.33 
I am wary of lowering constitutional scrutiny, even during a 
devastating pandemic.34 It makes it too tempting for the state to use 
the emergency as a pretext to limit rights, especially the rights of the 
most vulnerable members of society. We have seen it happen in the 
past.35 We see it now, where states hostile to women’s equality have 
successfully invoked the pandemic to stymy the constitutional right to 
abortion.36  
 
 29.  Id. at 27. 
 30.  Id. at 26 (“But the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every 
person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times 
and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.”). 
 31.  Id. at 26 (“Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which 
recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own . . . regardless of the injury that may 
be done to others”); see also id. at 26–27 (“Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not 
unrestricted license to act according to one’s own will. It is only freedom from restraint under 
conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others.”).  
 32.  Cassell v. Snyders, No. 20 C 50153, 2020 WL 2112374, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2020). 
 33.  See, e.g., Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, No. 20 C 2782, 2020 WL 
2468194, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2020) (“[Plaintiffs] have failed to demonstrate either.”), aff’d, 
962 F.3d 341 (7th Cir. 2020); Cross Culture Christian Ctr. v. Newsom, No. 2:20-cv-00832-JAM-
CKD, 2020 WL 2121111, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2020). 
 34.  Cf. Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, No. CIV 20-0327 JB\SCY, 2020 WL 1905586, at *30 
(D.N.M. Apr. 17, 2020) (“Nonetheless, no matter how grave the emergency, individual 
constitutional freedoms—such as the free exercise of religion, one of the United States’ most 
treasured and closely guarded liberties—constrain state action.”). 
 35.  See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding forced 
internment of Japanese-American men, women, and children on national security grounds).  
 36.  See, e.g., In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 784–85 (5th Cir. 2020) (upholding ban on non-
emergency abortions under Jacobson standard); In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1027–28 (8th Cir. 
2020) (same); Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1179–80 (11th Cir. 2020) (applying 
Jacobson). That these bans were a pretext to eliminate abortion rather than preserve medical 
resources or prevent the spread of coronavirus became evident by the bans’ inclusion of medical 
abortion, which can be provided remotely.  
8  DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 70:1 
Of course, while “[t]here is no pandemic exception to the 
Constitution of the United States,”37 we ought not pretend there is no 
national health crisis either. Thus, the doctrine from Smith should still 
be applied with an eye towards the exigencies of the pandemic.38 In 
other words, I recommend analyzing the First Amendment claims 
under the regular rules, mindful that their application should 
nonetheless be informed by the background conditions. Notably, even 
the courts that cite to Jacobson also apply the Smith free exercise test 
to the religious liberty challenges.  
There is a possibility that the Supreme Court will soon jettison 
Smith’s neutral and generally applicable test.39 In South Bay United 
Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, it is not altogether clear whether the 
Justices thought Jacobson, Smith, or some other test should control, as 
five of the Justices did not join a written opinion.40 Chief Justice 
Roberts never explicitly mentioned Smith or its test in his concurring 
opinion,41 and neither did the dissent.42 As stated above, I think the 
better approach is to follow the usual standards with an eye toward the 
present exigencies.43  
 
 37.  Berean Baptist Church v. Cooper, No. 4:20-CV-81-D, 2020 WL 2514313, at *1 (E.D.N.C. 
May 16, 2020). 
 38.  Cf. Cassell v. Snyders, No. 20 C 50153, 2020 WL 2112374, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2020) 
(“The Constitution does not compel courts to turn a blind eye to the realities of the COVID-19 
crisis.”). 
 39.  Amy Howe, Justices to Take Up Case Involving Faith-Based Adoption Agencies and 
Same-Sex Couples, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 24, 2020, 3:33 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/02/justices-to-take-up-case-involving-faith-based-adoption-
agencies-and-same-sex-couples [https://perma.cc/9ZNU-E9L9] (noting that the Supreme Court 
may reconsider its neutral and generally applicable test in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia). 
 40.  Chief Justice Roberts wrote only for himself, while Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined 
Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613–
14 (2020); id. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 41.  Although the Chief Justice suggested that the executive order was neutral and generally 
applicable without ever using that particular language, see id. at 1613, he also cited Jacobson and 
emphasized that the politically accountable branches ought to have “especially broad” latitude 
during a pandemic rife with “medical and scientific uncertainties.” Id.  
 42.  See id. at 1614–15 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 43.  It is also worth noting that eliminating Smith for Free Exercise Clause claims would not 
eliminate strict scrutiny, as it is part of the Sherbert v. Verner test as well. In addition to 
constitutional claims, some religious objectors have also brought claims under their state 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). See, e.g., Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. 
Northam, No. 2:20cv204, 2020 WL 2110416, at *14–16 (E.D. Va. May 1, 2020) (rejecting Virginia 
Act for Religious Freedom claim); Cassell, 2020 WL 2112374, at *12–13 (rejecting Plaintiff’s 
Illinois RFRA claim). These state laws are based on the federal Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, which only applies to federal laws. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.); see generally 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the federal RFRA when applied to 
state laws was beyond Congress’s enforcement power under the 14th amendment). RFRAs 
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II. BANS AS NEUTRAL AND GENERALLY APPLICABLE 
An order is neutral if it does not target religion,44 and it is 
generally applicable if it applies broadly to the relevant population.45 
Or, as the Ninth Circuit recently summarized: “Where state action does 
not ‘infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious 
motivation’ [(neutrality)] and does not ‘in a selective manner impose 
burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief,’ [(general 
applicability)] it does not violate the First Amendment.”46 While 
neutrality and general applicability are separate inquiries, the two 
issues are interrelated. If a law is not neutral because it singles religion 
out for disfavor, then it stands a good chance of failing the generally 
applicable requirement as well.47  
As in Virginia, in April 2020 most states imposed blanket bans on 
mass gatherings.48 Louisiana’s ban on “the gathering of more than ten 
people in a single space at a single time” is typical.49 By and large, these 
bans, which prohibit any gatherings of more than a certain number of 
people, are neutral because they do not single out religious gatherings, 
and they are generally applicable because they apply to all mass 
gatherings over a certain size.  
 
provide more protection than the U.S. Constitution because any substantial burden on religious 
practice will trigger strict scrutiny, not only those regulations that do not qualify as “neutral and 
generally applicable.” Id. at 532. In other words, it imports the old Sherbert v. Verner test into the 
statute. Id. at 515. However, as with a constitutional challenge, if a law passes strict scrutiny in a 
state RFRA challenge, then the state’s law must be followed.  
 44.  A law is not neutral if “the object of [the] law is to infringe upon or restrict practices 
because of their religious motivation.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). 
 45.  A law is not generally applicable if it “in a selective manner impose[s] burdens only on 
conduct motivated by religious belief.” Id. at 543.  
 46.  S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 959 F.3d 938, 939 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533, 543). 
 47.  Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531 (“Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and, as 
becomes apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the 
other has not been satisfied.”). 
 48.  See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text.  
 49.  Spell v. Edwards, No. 20-00282-BAJ-EWD, 2020 WL 2509078, at *1 (M.D. La. May 15, 
2020) (quoting La. Exec. Dep’t, Proclamation No. 52 JBE 2020, § 2(A) (Apr. 30, 2020), 
http://lpdb.la.gov/Proclamations/52-JBE-2020-State-of-Emergency-COVID-19-Extension-to-
May-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/6996-6SYX]), vacated as moot, 962 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 2020); see, e.g., 
Roberts v. Neace, No. 2:20cv054 (WOB-CJS), 2020 WL 2115358, at *1 (E.D. Ky. May 4, 2020) 
(“The Order [issued by the governor of Kentucky] states: ‘Mass gatherings include any event or 
convening that brings together groups of individuals, including, but not limited to, community, 
civic, public, leisure, faith-based, or sporting events; parades; concerts; festivals; conventions; 
fundraisers; and similar activities.’” (quoting Ky. Exec. Order No. 2020-319, § 2 (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://governor.ky.gov/attachments/20200319_Order_Mass-Gatherings.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WYC2-5QF3])). 
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Plaintiffs, mostly Christian churches, argue that these bans fail to 
meet this standard because they contain numerous exceptions for 
secular activities deemed essential. Virginia’s Executive Order 53, for 
example, included a carveout for “essential retail businesses,” which 
includes grocery stores, liquor stores, pet stores, pharmacies, 
electronics retailers, office supply stores, home improvement and 
garden stores, auto repair centers, gas stations, banks, and 
laundromats.50 Other states had similar lists.51 (The California 
Governor’s re-opening plan challenged in South Bay allowed “lower 
risk” workplaces including retail, outdoor museums, childcare, and 
offices to reopen before “higher risk” activities such as entertainment 
venues, salons, gyms, and in-person religious services.)52 As discussed 
below, whether the religious liberty claim has any traction depends on 
whether these exempted activities are analogous to religious services.  
A. Neutrality  
The neutrality requirement is meant to capture discriminatory 
treatment.53 In fact, the Free Exercise Clause often functions as an 
equal protection clause for religion by prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of religion. In fleshing out the meaning of neutrality, the 
Supreme Court specifically drew on equal protection doctrine in its 
 
 50.  The Virginia Executive Order defined essential businesses as:  
[g]rocery stores, pharmacies, and other retailers that sell food and beverage products 
or pharmacy products, including dollar stores and department stores with grocery or 
pharmacy options; [m]edical, laboratory, and vision supply retailers; [e]lectronic 
retailers that sell or service cell phones, computers, tablets, and other communication 
technology; [a]utomotive parts, accessories, and tire retailers as well as automotive 
repair facilities; [h]ome improvement, hardware, building material, and building supply 
retailers; [l]awn and garden equipment retailers; [b]eer, wine, and liquor stores; [r]etail 
functions of gas and convenience stores; [r]etail located within healthcare facilities; 
[b]anks and other financial institutions with retail functions; [p]et and feed stores; 
[p]rinting and office supply stores; and [l]aundromats and dry cleaners. 
Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, No. 2:20cv204, 2020 WL 2110416, at *6 (E.D. Va. May 
1, 2020).  
 51.  For example, Maine’s list of exempted businesses included “grocery stores, household 
goods stores, gas stations, hardware stores, home repair stores, garden centers and stores, child 
care services, and medical marijuana dispensaries.” Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, No. 1:20-
cv-00156-NT, 2020 WL 2310913, at *3 (D. Me. May 9, 2020). 
 52.  Meanwhile, these “higher risk” activities were to re-open before the “highest risk” 
activities such as concerts, convention centers, and live audience sports. CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. 
HEALTH, UPDATE ON CALIFORNIA’S PANDEMIC ROADMAP (2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/Update-on-California-Pandemic-Roadmap.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YCX5-3GCL]. 
 53.  See supra note 44. 
2020] RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS IN A PANDEMIC 11 
analysis.54 In particular, the Court referenced equal protection 
standards when it underscored that non-neutral laws encompass those 
that are “enacted ‘“because of,” not merely “in spite of,”’ their 
suppression of . . . religious practice.”55 In other words, the touchstone 
of neutrality is whether “the object of [the] law is to infringe upon or 
restrict practices because of their religious motivation.”56 
At a minimum, a neutral law must be neutral on its face.57 A ban 
on all mass gatherings, whether religious or secular, is neutral on its 
face.58 A few religious objectors have argued that bans cannot be 
facially neutral when they mention religious worship by name,59 but 
merely including “worship services” in a list of examples does not 
defeat facial neutrality.60 Clarifying that religious gatherings are part of 
a long list of restricted gatherings61 is not at all the same as singling out 
religious gatherings, and only religious gatherings, for restrictions.  
Neutrality is not limited to facial neutrality. “The Free Exercise 
Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked as well 
as overt.”62 Nevertheless, in most if not all cases, there is little 
indication that the governors who shut down mass gatherings had any 
goal other than protecting the health and safety of their citizens.  
However, some courts infer hostility if religion is treated 
differently from its secular counterparts. This certainly seems to be the 
 
 54.  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993) (“In 
determining if the object of a law is a neutral one under the Free Exercise Clause, we can also 
find guidance in our equal protection cases.”). 
 55.  Id. (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
 56.  Id. at 533 (emphasis added). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  See, e.g., Cassell v. Snyders, No. 20 C 50153, 2020 WL 2112374, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 
2020) (“[T]he Order proscribes secular and religious conduct alike. . . . Indeed, its limitations 
extend to most places where people gather, from museums to theaters to bowling alleys.” (citing 
Ill. Exec. Order No. 2020-32, § 2, ¶ 3 (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/Executive-
Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020-32.aspx [https://perma.cc/JY9D-SYFG], which forbids “any 
gathering of more than ten people”)). 
 59.  See, e.g., First Baptist Church v. Kelly, No. 20-1102-JWB, 2020 WL 1910021, at *7 (D. 
Kan. Apr. 18, 2020) (“EO 20-18 and EO 20-25 both state that their prohibitions against mass 
gatherings apply to ‘churches or other religious facilities.’ . . . These provisions show that these 
executive orders expressly target religious gatherings on a broad scale and are, therefore, not 
facially neutral.”).  
 60.  Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, No. 2:20cv204, 2020 WL 2110416, at *5 
(E.D. Va. May 1, 2020) (“Executive Order 55 presents no neutrality problem; it merely uses 
religious gatherings as one of several examples of ‘all public and private in-person gatherings.’ 
The Orders are facially neutral.”). 
 61.  See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text for examples of religious services being 
included in a ban, rather than targeted specifically by a ban. 
 62.  Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534.  
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working assumption of the concurrence and dissent in South Bay, 
which both focus on how religious worship compares to its secular 
counterparts, and what in fact counts as a secular counterpart.63  
If the true secular counterparts are other mass gatherings, then 
there is no discrimination: No hostility toward religion can be gleaned 
from banning all gatherings of a certain size, whether they be in 
schools, museums, movie theatres, restaurants, sports arenas, gyms, or 
houses of worship.64 Or as Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “the Order 
exempts or treats more leniently only dissimilar activities.”65  
Indeed, perhaps to “acknowledge religious worship’s 
importance,”66 a few states treated religious gatherings more favorably 
than secular ones.67 The governor of New Mexico, for example, let 
people gather to worship for a period of time after shuttering venues 
like movie theatres and concert halls.68 Under Virginia’s stay-at-home 
order, houses of worship were one of the few places people were 
allowed to visit.69 Thus, any differential treatment of mass gatherings 
tended to skew in favor of religious gatherings, not against them.  
The dissent in South Bay disagreed as to which activities 
amounted to secular counterparts—an issue the next section discusses 
in depth. Even assuming some dissimilar treatment of similar conduct, 
it is still an open question whether all deviations amount to 
discrimination against religion. To allow all mass gatherings except 
religious worship inexorably leads to the conclusion that the point of 
the law was to burden religious exercise. It is harder to insist on that 
conclusion when not only religious gatherings are banned, but a long 
list of secular gatherings are as well, even if a few secular counterparts 
 
 63.  S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613, 1615 (2020).  
 64.  Cf. Spell v. Edwards, No. 20-00282-BAJ-EWD, 2020 WL 2509078, at *5 (M.D. La. May 
15, 2020) (“[T]he Governor’s order restricts religious and non-religious gatherings to the exact 
same extent and degree.”), vacated as moot, 962 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 2020); Maryville Baptist 
Church, Inc. v. Beshear, No. 3:20-cv-278-DJH, 2020 WL 1909616, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 18, 2020) 
(“[T]he order temporarily prohibits ‘[a]ll mass gatherings,’ not merely religious gatherings. 
Religious expression is not singled out.”). 
 65.  S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 66.  Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, No. CIV 20-0327 JB\SCY 2020 WL 1905586, at *41 
(D.N.M. Apr. 17, 2020). 
 67.  Id. (“Moreover, religious organizations have received preferential treatment relative to 
their closest comparators . . . .”). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, No. 2:20cv204, 2020 WL 2110416, at *5 
(E.D. Va. May 1, 2020) (“Executive Order 55 . . . singles out religion for favorable treatment by 
recognizing the importance of traveling to and from places of worship.”). 
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are still allowed. In sum, because mass gathering bans are not 
motivated by intentional targeting of religion, they are neutral.  
B. General Applicability  
General applicability is another way to ferret out unfavorable 
treatment of religion. The idea is that “government, in pursuit of 
legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only 
on conduct motivated by religious belief.”70 That is, the government 
cannot accomplish its goals at the expense of religious organizations 
alone. When religious conduct must bear the cost, but not secular 
conduct that “endangers [the government’s] interests in a similar or 
greater degree,”71 a law is underinclusive and not generally applicable. 
A law may be underinclusive if its initial scope is too limited, or if it 
contains too many exemptions.72 If this standard sounds somewhat 
vague, it is. The Court has not yet enunciated hard and fast rules for 
general applicability.73 
As a result, the doctrinal line demarcating generally applicable 
from not generally applicable is not a bright one. Courts and 
commentators have argued that a law is not generally applicable if it 
contains no exemptions for religious conduct when there are 
exemptions for analogous secular conduct,74 but disagree on how many 
exemptions are too many.75 Plainly, a ban that is gerrymandered to 
target only religious conduct is not generally applicable,76 especially 
 
 70.  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993). 
 71.  Id. (“They fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a 
similar or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does.”); see, e.g., Legacy Church, 2020 WL 
3963764, at *81 (“Although all laws ‘are selective to some extent,’ a regulation is not generally 
applicable when the government affords favorable treatment to secular conduct ‘that endangers 
the [government]’s interests in a similar or greater degree’ as does restricted religious activity.”). 
 72.  And when this happens, it also may raise the question about whether the government’s 
stated goal is its true goal or merely a pretext for discrimination, casting into doubt its neutrality. 
 73.  Cf. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543 (“In this case we need not define with precision the standard 
used to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application, for these ordinances fall well 
below the minimum standard necessary to protect First Amendment rights.”); Legacy Church, 
2020 WL 3963764, at *89 (“That the Supreme Court’s Justices and the lower courts cannot agree 
what states may do to guard against a once-in-a-generation public health threat demonstrates the 
confusion of the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise doctrine.”). 
 74.  Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[A] law might appear to be 
generally applicable on the surface but not be so in practice due to exceptions for comparable 
secular activities.”).  
 75.  Cf. Legacy Church, 2020 WL 3963764, at *89 (“The Sixth Circuit asserted, as a ‘rule of 
thumb,’ that ‘the more exceptions to a prohibition, the less likely it will count as a generally 
applicable, non-discriminatory law.’”).  
 76.  Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535 (“The design of these laws accomplishes instead a ‘religious 
gerrymander,’ an impermissible attempt to target petitioners and their religious practices.”). 
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when the decisionmakers openly express hostility towards religion.77 
However, a few lower courts have argued that even one secular 
exemption defeats general applicability.78 Thus, for example, a police 
department ban on beards was held not generally applicable because it 
exempted officers with skin issues but not officers with religious 
commitments.79 At the same time, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that “[a]ll laws are selective to some extent.”80 Indeed, 
the drug ban found to be generally applicable in Employment Division 
v. Smith itself had exceptions.81  
In addition to disagreement about how many analogous 
exceptions are too many, courts evaluating religious liberty challenges 
to the pandemic bans have disputed what counts as an analogous 
activity. If every large gathering is banned, with no exceptions, then the 
mass gathering bans are generally applicable. Religious and secular 
mass gatherings alike share the burden.  
Nonetheless, churches argue that limiting the analysis to mass 
gatherings is the wrong denominator, and that myriad other 
comparable activities, like shopping in a liquor store and visiting a 
superstore, should also be included.82 If the denominator is thereby 
expanded, the religious objectors claim, the states’ regulations become 
riddled with exemptions and cannot be generally applicable.83 Indeed, 
Justice Kavanaugh, dissenting in South Bay, argues that to exempt 
secular counterparts and not worship services amounts to 
discrimination against religion that is “odious to our Constitution.”84 
 
 77.  Id. at 540–42 (cataloguing comments hostile to Santeria made by city council and 
residents). 
 78.  See Fraternal Ord. of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 1999); Mitchell 
Cty. v. Zimmerman, 810 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2012) (holding that a ban on vehicles with steel wheels 
was not neutral and generally applicable because school buses and fire trucks were exempted). 
 79.  Fraternal Ord. of Police, 170 F.3d at 366. 
 80.  Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542. 
 81.  Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990) (“Oregon law prohibits the knowing or 
intentional possession of a ‘controlled substance’ unless the substance has been prescribed by a 
medical practitioner.”). 
 82.  Cf. Cassell v. Snyders, No. 20 C 50153, 2020 WL 2112374, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2020) 
(“If Walmart and Menards are allowed to host more than ten visitors, Plaintiffs’ theory goes, then 
so should the Beloved Church.”). 
 83.  See, e.g., Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, No. CIV 20-0327 JB\SCY, 2020 WL 1905586, 
at *34 (D.N.M. Apr. 17, 2020) (“Legacy Church contends that the April 11 Order is not generally 
applicable, because it allows ‘big box retailers to continue to welcome patrons’ while prohibiting 
church services.”). 
 84.  S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1614–15 (2020) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
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Of course, churches cannot claim that they are victims of 
discrimination unless the state is treating like-activities differently.85 If 
a state’s order is treating two activities differently because they are in 
fact different—if the essential activities that are exempted are not 
analogous to the forbidden church services—then those activities 
should not form part of the general applicability denominator.  
So what are these other activities, and are they comparable to in-
person religious worship? As described above, states often have an 
extensive list of exceptions for essential businesses.86 In addition to 
various retail stores ranging from grocery and liquor stores to garden 
centers to gas stations, some include child care facilities and a few also 
permit businesses like law and accounting firms to remain open.87 Also 
included are exceptions for basic infrastructure like industry, 
transportation, and utilities. However, most challenges have focused 
on the other exceptions, particularly retail shops.88 In deciding whether 
these activities are distinguishable or not, courts have compared (1) 
how essential the activities are, and (2) how dangerous.  
1. Essential versus Non-Essential 
 
In evaluating essentialness, courts have considered both whether 
the activity is essential in the sense that people could not do without it, 
and whether it is essential in the sense that there are no alternatives 
available.  
a. Essential as Necessary to Life 
 
Courts upholding the bans have offered different reasons for why 
these activities are distinguishable, some more persuasive than others. 
A few courts have argued that the exempted activities were essential 
 
 85.  Legacy Church, 2020 WL 1905586, at *33 (“Lukumi and Smith require the Court, 
however, to compare analogous exemptions.”). 
 86.  Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 412–13 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Among the many exempt 
entities are laundromats, accounting services, law firms, hardware stores, airlines, mining 
operations, funeral homes, landscaping businesses, and grocery stores.”). 
 87.  Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, No. 2:20cv204, 2020 WL 2110416, at *3 
(E.D. Va. May 1, 2020) (“The Order permits ‘business operations offering professional rather 
than retail services to remain open,’ but directs that ‘they should utilize teleworking as much as 
possible.’”).  
 88.  See, e.g., Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, No. 1:20-cv-00156-NT, 2020 WL 2310913, 
at *8 (D. Me. May 9, 2020) (“In particular, the Plaintiff notes that there is an exemption from the 
ten-person limit for ‘liquor stores, warehouse clubs, supercenter stores, [and] marijuana 
dispensaries.’”). 
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to survival in a way that church is not.89 For example, people literally 
cannot live without food, drink, and medicine.90 Health care workers 
could not get to their jobs and save people’s lives without gas and 
childcare.91 People cannot work from home without certain equipment 
and technology.92 As one court ruled, “[t]his limited carveout does not 
target religious gatherings. It simply ensures that people have access to 
essential goods.”93  
This argument has two potential weaknesses. To start, it does not 
fully explain the exemptions for professionals that a few states have 
included. Stores ensure ample food and drink and habitable homes 
safeguard people’s physical survival, but how does your accountant? 
One court used income as the link: If professional people lose their 
jobs, they will lack the income and health care necessary to sustain 
themselves and their families.94 But hospitality workers also need to 
earn money, yet hotels and restaurants were still shuttered under the 
mass gathering bans.95 Perhaps the argument is that in contemporary 
society, certain professional skills are also necessary for families to 
survive, although this expands the definition of survival beyond 
immediate physical need.  
In addition, the conclusion arguably embeds a contested value 
judgment about what is essential to human flourishing.96 The objecting 
churches argue houses of worship provide just as essential a service as 
supermarkets and certainly more essential than liquor stores. Judge 
Justin Walker agreed, writing: “But if beer is ‘essential,’ so is Easter.”97 
 
 89.  Legacy Church, 2020 WL 1905586, at *40 (“Each and every business mentioned by 
Legacy Church either sells items necessary for everyday life or to facilitate the mitigation of 
COVID-19.”). 
 90.  Id. (“All these stores facilitate the purchase of necessary items that help treat ill 
individuals who are staying at home, or that make a house habitable, or that feed people so they 
can stay alive.”). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Lighthouse Fellowship Church, 2020 WL 2110416, at *7. 
 93.  Id. at *6; see also Roberts v. Neace, No. 2:20cv054 (WOB-CJS), 2020 WL 2115358, at *3 
(E.D. Ky. May 4, 2020) (“[T]here is an undeniable difference between certain activities that are, 
literally, life sustaining and other that are not.”). 
 94.  Lighthouse Fellowship Church, 2020 WL 2110416, at *7 (“Although these [professional] 
businesses may not be essential, the exception crafted on their behalf is essential to prevent 
joblessness at a time when people desperately need to retain their income and healthcare . . . .”).  
 95.  See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.  
 96.  Cf. Roberts, 2020 WL 2115358, at *3 (“And while plaintiffs argue that faith-based 
gatherings are as important as physical sustenance, as a literal matter, they are not life-sustaining 
in the physical sense.”). 
 97.  On Fire Christian Ctr., Inc. v. Fischer, No. 3:20-CV-264-JRW, 2020 WL 1820249, at *7 
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 11, 2020). 
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At first blush, the designation of liquor stores as essential may be 
puzzling. Yet many sell more than just alcohol, and so they are 
classified as a food and beverage establishment.98 Moreover, as one 
court pointed out, the abrupt denial of alcohol to those dependent on 
it may endanger them and burden the health care system.99 Or as 
Scientific American put it, “Because so few people have access to 
medications for AUD [Alcohol Use Disorder], access to alcohol 
becomes a matter of life or death.”100 Still, the initial point remains: 
people must nourish their souls as well as their bodies. Indeed, to 
valorize the physical over the spiritual may not adequately express 
everyone’s priorities. For some, cultivating their relationship with God 
provides more benefit than cultivating a garden.  
b. Essential as No Alternative Available  
 
Nevertheless, even assuming worship services are equally 
“essential”101 in terms of religion’s centrality to people’s lives, 
gathering in person to worship may not be necessary in the way that 
heading to the market is. That is, there may be no other way to procure 
an exempted essential service but to physically go somewhere in 
person, while alternatives exist for religious services.102 We must eat, 
yet most of us cannot grow our own food and therefore must purchase 
it from a supermarket. For those who must worship, alternatives to in-
church services abound.103 People may pray to God on their own at 
 
 98.  Keith Dunlap, Why Are Liquor Stores Considered ‘Essential’ During Covid-19 
Pandemic? Here Are Five Reasons, CLICK ORLANDO (Mar. 31, 2020, 10:56 AM), 
https://www.clickorlando.com/features/2020/03/31/why-are-liquor-stores-considered-essential-
during-covid-19-pandemic-here-are-5-reasons [https://perma.cc/TPE8-MUJ9] (noting that many 
liquor stores sell food).  
 99.  Lighthouse Fellowship Church, 2020 WL 2110416, at *7 (“The danger posed by sudden 
alcohol withdrawal to those suffering from alcohol dependence, and the added burden upon 
health facilities that this might trigger, are significant factors that must be considered.”).  
 100.  Max Jordan Nguemeni Tiako & Kelsey C. Priest, Yes, Liquor Stores Are Essential 
Businesses, SCI. AM. (Apr. 7, 2020), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/yes-liquor-
stores-are-essential-businesses [https://perma.cc/ZQH4-7RZV]. 
 101.  Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, No. CIV 20-0327 JB\SCY, 2020 WL 1905586, at *40 
(D.N.M. Apr. 17, 2020) (“The Court recognizes that, to many individuals, religious worship is 
equally essential and important to life.”). 
 102.  Antietam Battlefield KOA v. Hogan, No. CCB-20-1130, 2020 WL 2556496, at *8 (D. 
Md. May 20, 2020) (“[U]nlike religious services, [these essential services] cannot operate 
remotely.”).  
 103.  Lighthouse Fellowship Church, 2020 WL 2110416, at *8 (“Plaintiff has failed to 
demonstrate that it is incapable of practicing its religion or providing spiritual guidance to its 
members in groups of ten or fewer.”).  
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home or together outside, online, or at drive-in services.104 Certainly, 
most houses of worship provided alternate ways to meet their 
congregations’ religious needs.105 To be sure, the experience is not 
exactly the same as in-person fellowship,106 but little in our lives today 
is exactly the same.107  
There are rebuttals and counter-rebuttals to both claims. 
Although people must buy food, why not have it delivered rather than 
purchase it in person? Of course, that assumes both the availability and 
affordability of delivery services, which simply may not be the state of 
affairs for all people and for all stores.108 At the same time, even if most 
religions do not mandate that worship take the form of large in-person 
gatherings, perhaps a few do.109 Then again, whether the fact that a 
small number of churches insist that they are religiously obliged to 
meet en masse should defeat general applicability is a different 
question. After all, there are presumably secular activities that are 
equally meaningful for people that are likewise precluded by the ban 
on mass gatherings.110  
2. Public Health Risk 
 
 104.  Cf. Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, No. 3:20-cv-278-DJH, 2020 WL 1909616, 
at *1 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 18, 2020) (“None of the challenged orders limits other avenues of group 
worship, such as drive-in, online, video or telephone conferencing, Facebook, or broadcast radio 
or television.”); Cassell v. Snyders, No. 20 C 50153, 2020 WL 2112374, at *13 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 
2020) (“In addition to drive-in services and smaller worship services, the Order permits Cassell 
and other staff members to visit and minister to parishioners in their homes. It allows small group 
meetings, bible study meetings, and prayer gatherings at the church or in private homes, subject 
to the ten-person limit.”). 
 105.  See, e.g., Emily McFarlan Miller, Churches Go Back to the Future with Drive-In Services 
in the Time of the Coronavirus, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://religionnews.com/2020/03/23/churches-go-back-to-the-future-with-drive-in-services-in-
the-time-of-the-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/MN3E-JS37]; Sarah Pulliam Bailey & Ruth Eglash, 
With Passover, Easter and Ramadan Looming, Clergy Scramble to Create Holidays at a Distance, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2020, 11:53 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2020/04/03/
easter-passover-ramadan-religious-coronavirus-closures [https://perma.cc/382P-ASR2]. 
 106.  Cf. Tabernacle Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, No. 3:20-cv-00033-GFVT, 2020 WL 
2305307, at *2 (E.D. Ky. May 8, 2020) (“For Plaintiff, these substitutes offer cold comfort.”). 
 107.  Cassell, 2020 WL 2112374, at *2 (“The virus has killed hundreds of thousands, infected 
millions, and disrupted the lives of nearly everyone on the planet.”); Roberts v. Neace, No. 
2:20cv054 (WOB-CJS), 2020 WL 2115358, at *4 (E.D. Ky. May 4, 2020) (“Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine that there is any American that has not been impacted [by the pandemic].”).  
 108.  Moreover, some items cannot be delivered, like gas.  
 109.  On Fire Christian Ctr., Inc. v. Fischer, No. 3:20-CV-264-JRW, 2020 WL 1820249, at *9 
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 11, 2020) (“On Fire ‘and its members have a sincerely held religious belief that 
physical corporate gathering of believers each Sunday . . . is a central element of religious worship 
commanded by the Lord.’”). 
 110.  Large family reunions, for example, cannot take place.  
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Courts have also considered the threat to public health posed by 
extended worship services compared to the exceptions, like those for 
grocery store shopping. Indeed, the issue of risk is usually the pivotal 
question.111 Those courts and Justices that have found in-person 
religious services less safe than shopping for food or other essential 
services have ruled against the objecting churches, whereas those 
finding they pose an equal health risk have ruled in favor of them.112 
For example, one district court ruled in favor of a church with the 
observation that “[i]f social distancing is good enough for Home Depot 
and Kroger, it is good enough for in-person religious services.”113 In 
contrast, Chief Justice Roberts found in South Bay that religious 
gatherings were “dissimilar” from activities “such as operating grocery 
stores, banks, and laundromats.”114 
For the most part, the science right now suggests worship services 
and activities like shopping are not comparable. Although there is still 
much we do not know about the virus and its transmission, studies have 
established that people are contagious even before they exhibit 
symptoms.115 Experts also think that the coronavirus spreads mainly by 
person-to-person contact via droplets (which are larger) and aerosols 
(which are smaller and airborne).116 As a result, the risks of 
 
 111.  Cassell, 2020 WL 2112374, at *9 (“But the question is not whether any secular 
organization faces fewer restrictions than any religious organization. Rather, the question is 
whether secular conduct ‘that endangers the [government]’s interests in a similar or greater 
degree’ receives favorable treatment.”); Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, No. 1:20-cv-00156-
NT, 2020 WL 2310913, at *8 (D. Me. May 9, 2020) (same).  
 112.  Compare Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[M]any of the serial 
exemptions for secular activities pose comparable public health risks to worship services.”), with 
Calvary Chapel, 2020 WL 2310913, at *8 (“Gatherings in houses of worship present a greater risk 
to the public health than shopping at a grocery store or other retail outlet.”). 
 113.  Tabernacle Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, No. 3:20-cv-00033-GFVT, 2020 WL 
2305307, at *5 (E.D. Ky. May 8, 2020). 
 114.  S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring).  
 115.  In fact, infectiousness may peak right at the beginning. At least one study “observed the 
highest viral load in throat swabs at the time of symptom onset, and inferred that infectiousness 
peaked on or before symptom onset.” Xi He et al., Temporal Dynamics in Viral Shedding and 
Transmissibility of COVID-19, 26 NATURE MED. 672, 672 (2020); see also Tina Hesman Saey, 
Covid-19 May Be Most Contagious One or Two Days Before Symptoms Appear, SCI. NEWS (Apr. 
15, 2020, 5:39 PM), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/coronavirus-covid-19-infection-
contagious-days-before-symptoms-appear [https://perma.cc/942X-22VT] (noting that individuals 
are most likely to spread Covid-19 before they feel ill). Roughly 40 percent of transmission occurs 
before the person shows symptoms according to CDC estimates. Aschwanden, supra note 11.  
 116. How Covid-19 Spreads, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-
getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html [https://perma.cc/JLV8-94Q4] (last updated June 16, 2020); 
Tanya Lewis, How Coronavirus Spreads Through the Air: What We Know So Far, SCI. AM. (May 
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transmission appear greater in closed spaces, especially if they are 
poorly ventilated;117 when many people are close together;118 and when 
they interact with each other for longer periods of time.119 The World 
Health Organization is now advising people to “Avoid the Three C’s: 
Confined and enclosed places, Crowded places, and Close-contact 
settings.”120  
Singing and speaking also seem to be risk factors.121 For instance, 
one of the most notable outbreaks in the United States was traced to a 
choir rehearsal at a church.122 Even though the singers took care to 
apply hand sanitizer and observe social distancing, 53 out of 61 
 
12, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-coronavirus-spreads-through-the-air-
what-we-know-so-far1 [https://perma.cc/LG89-82B6]; Lidia Morawska & Donald K. Milton, It Is 
Time To Address Airborne Transmission of COVID-19, CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES (July 
6, 2020) https://academic.oup.com/cid/advance-article/doi/10.1093/cid/ciaa939/5867798 
[https://perma.cc/9J3T-GLYW]; Apoorva Mandavilli, The Coronavirus Can Be Airborne Indoors, 
W.H.O. Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/health/virus-
aerosols-who.html [https://perma.cc/HK2F-UE98]; Phoebe Southworth, Coronavirus Could 
Travel Five Meters Through Air, Study Finds, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 15, 2020, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/08/15/coronavirus-could-travel-five-metres-air-study-
finds [https://perma.cc/8QKT-5LB7]. 
 117.  Kai Kupferschmidt, Why Do Some COVID-19 Patients Infect Many Others, Whereas 
Most Don’t Spread the Virus at All?, SCIENCE (May 19, 2020, 5:25 PM), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/05/why-do-some-covid-19-patients-infect-many-others-
whereas-most-don-t-spread-virus-all [https://perma.cc/372D-PGUS] (“Researchers in China 
studying the spread of the coronavirus outside Hubei province—ground zero for the pandemic—
identified 318 clusters of three or more cases between 4 January and 11 February, only one of 
which originated outdoors.”); see also id. (describing another study that concluded that the risk 
of infection inside was 19 times higher than outside).  
 118.  Aschwanden, supra note 11 (describing the catalyst for super-spreader events as “large 
indoor crowd sizes, close contact between people, and confined spaces with poor ventilation”). 
 119.  See id. (“Time matters too. The longer a group stays in contact, the greater the likelihood 
that the virus will spread among them.”).  
 120.  WHO (@WHO), TWITTER (July 16, 2020, 11:36 PM), 
https://twitter.com/WHO/status/1283787493096202240?s=20 [https://perma.cc/5QCD-PGCH]; 
Epidemiologists in Japan have long warned against the three Cs: closed spaces, crowded places, 
and close-contact settings where people are talking face-to-face. OFFICE FOR NOVEL 
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE CONTROL, GOV’T OF JAPAN, AVOID THE ‘THREE CS’! (2020) 
https://corona.go.jp/prevention/pdf/en.cluster2.pdf [https://perma.cc/62WS-VVCN]. 
 121.  Kupferschmidt, supra note 117 (“[O]ne thing links numerous clusters: They happened 
in places where people shout or sing.”); Lewis, supra note 116 (“Some evidence suggests that 
talking could be a significant mode of viral transmission.”). For this reason, Germany has banned 
singing in churches. Kate Connolly, Germany to Set Out Rules for Religious Services Including 
Singing Ban, GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2020, 12:09 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2020/apr/29/germany-to-set-out-rules-for-religious-services-including-singing-ban 
[https://perma.cc/Q3LB-35MZ]. 
 122.  Richard Read, A Choir Decided to Go Ahead with Rehearsal. Now Dozens Have Covid-
19 and Two Are Dead, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2020, 7:34 PM), https://www.latimes.com/world-
nation/story/2020-03-29/coronavirus-choir-outbreak [https://perma.cc/39Y5-4U55]. 
2020] RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS IN A PANDEMIC 21 
contracted Covid-19.123 One doctor described that “[t]he combination 
of singing in close quarters and decreased ventilation” as “nothing 
short of a petri [sic] dish (or cell plate) for viral growth.”124 
In fact, religious services have been the vector for multiple 
coronavirus outbreaks.125 One CDC study found that after two positive 
worshippers attended church events, at least 35 of 92 attendees fell ill, 
with three dying.126 Moreover, at least 26 additional cases in the 
community could be traced to the outbreak, with one known death.127 
Every week brings new reports of churches serving as the locus of an 
outbreak.128 Despite efforts to sit six feet apart and avoid contact, 
churches that have reopened have found themselves closing again after 
an outbreak.129 Consequently, even when churches make considerable 
 
 123.  Lea Hamner et al., High SARS-CoV-2 Attack Rate Following Exposure at a Choir 
Practice — Skagit County, Washington, March 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 
606, 607 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6919e6-H.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LPK9-2F3U]. 
 124.  Kevin Kavanaugh, Churches Could be the Deadliest Places in the Covid-19 Pandemic, 
INFECTION CONTROL TODAY (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/covid-19/
churches-could-be-deadliest-places-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/JM5B-URWD]. 
 125.  See, e.g., Kyle Pfannenstiel, Officials Say Religious Revival Linked to 5 Hospitalizations, 
35 COVID-19 Cases, IDAHO FALLS POST REG. (June 9, 2020), https://www.postregister.com/
coronavirus/officials-say-religious-revival-linked-to-5-hospitalizations-35-covid-19-
cases/article_7a403f8e-ee4d-553a-92e8-0897c6419492.html [https://perma.cc/5NN2-SQPP]; Alex 
Wigglesworth, More COVID-19 Cases Linked to California Church Services, L.A. TIMES (May 
24, 2020, 12:02 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-24/more-coronavirus-
cases-linked-to-california-church-services [https://perma.cc/KK4E-27P7]; Jeremy Redmon, 
Georgia Struggles Over Whether to Restrict Congregations Amid Pandemic, ATL. J-CONST. (Mar. 
27, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/breaking-news/the-struggle-over-whether-restrict-
congregations-amid-pandemic/xjDx2urFFZqS7qsIR6Ma5H [https://perma.cc/AD4Q-BRK6]; see 
also Cassell v. Snyders, No. 20 C 50153, 2020 WL 2112374, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2020) (listing 
multiple “examples where religious services have accelerated the pathogen’s spread.”).  
 126.  Allison James et al., High COVID-19 Attack Rate Among Attendees at Events at a 
Church –Arkansas, March 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 632, 634 tbl. 1 (2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6920e2-H.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K4Q-
V2VS]. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Wyatt Massey, Church of God Denomination Facing Significant COVID-19 Outbreak; 
Leaders Won’t Say How Many Infected, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (July 7, 2020), 
https://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2020/jul/07/church-god-denomination-
outbreak/527007/#/questions/2602258 [https://perma.cc/SD4B-TD6H]; Celina Tebor, Oregon’s 
Biggest Coronavirus Outbreak Yet is Linked to Union County Church, State Officials Confirm, 
OREGONIAN (last updated June 17, 2020), https://www.oregonlive.com/coronavirus/2020/06/
coronavirus-outbreak-linked-to-eastern-oregon-church-surpasses-200-cases.html 
[https://perma.cc/56NP-MJKQ]. 
 129.  Kate Conger, Jack Healy & Lucy Tompkins, Churches Were Eager to Reopen. Now They 
Are Confronting Coronavirus Cases, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/us/coronavirus-churches-outbreaks.html 
[https://perma.cc/8528-9Y8J] (describing multiple outbreaks); Lateshia Beachum, Two Churches 
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efforts to protect their congregations—and not all churches are making 
these efforts130—coronavirus can spread. “[As] public health experts 
have emphasized . . . even with social distancing, the virus can easily 
spread through the air when hymns are sung and sermons preached 
inside closed spaces.”131  
No such clusters have been traced to people shopping at stores.132 
The nature of the excursion differs from worship services, and these 
differences present a lower risk profile.133 As Chief Justice Roberts 
observed, religious services where “large groups of people gather in 
close proximity for extended periods of time” are not analogous to 
activities like shopping where “people neither congregate in large 
groups nor remain in close proximity for extended periods.”134  
First, the typical time spent inside is much shorter. When people 
shop, they generally enter and leave the store as fast as they can.135 
 
Reclose After Faith Leaders and Congregants Get Coronavirus, WASH. POST (May 10, 2020, 4:33 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2020/05/19/two-churches-reclose-after-faith-
leaders-congregants-get-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/TP79-QJMU]. 
 130.  See, e.g., Carol Kuruvilla, Texas Pastor Apologizes After Allowing Hugging at Church 
After Dozens Contract COVID-19, HUFFINGTON POST (last updated July 8, 2020), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/calvary-chapel-san-antonio-covid-
19_n_5f036d95c5b6acab285432ac [https://perma.cc/8MTP-HKH8]; Bethany Clough, ‘I Want to 
Go to Church;’ Fresno Church Defies Health Orders with Singing and a Crowd, FRESNO BEE (May 
31, 2020, 12:54 PM), https://www.fresnobee.com/news/coronavirus/article243135876.html 
[https://perma.cc/UF73-JBS6]; Daniel Burke, A Louisiana Pastor Defies A State Order and Holds 
a Church Service with Hundreds of People, CNN (Mar. 18, 2020, 8:28 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/18/us/louisiana-pastor-coronavirus/index.html [https://perma.cc/
9E5J-VPRN]. 
 131.  Conger, Healy & Tompkins, supra note 129 (describing multiple outbreaks). 
 132.  Cassell v. Snyders, No. 20 C 50153, 2020 WL 2112374, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2020) 
(“There are many examples where religious services have accelerated the pathogen’s spread . . . 
In comparison, Plaintiffs have failed to identify a grocery store or liquor store that has acted as a 
vector for the virus.”). The calculus may differ for those working unprotected all day long at these 
locations.  
 133.  While not exactly analogous, a study of an outbreak at a South Korean call center 
highlights the different risks of transitory interactions compared to extended contact. Roughly 
half the employees on one floor, most sitting on the same side of the floor, became infected. Yet, 
according to the Korean CDC, “[d]espite considerable interaction between workers on different 
floors of building X in the elevators and lobby, spread of COVID-19 was limited almost 
exclusively to the 11th floor, which indicates that the duration of interaction (or contact) was 
likely the main facilitator for further spreading.” Aylin Woodward, You’re Most Likely To Catch 
the Coronavirus in a Poorly Ventilated Space. That Makes Offices Very Risky., BUS. INSIDER (May 
6, 2020, 12:46 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-risk-higher-tight-indoor-spaces-
with-little-air-flow-2020-5 [https://perma.cc/6KPW-HE9E]. 
 134.  S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring).  
 135.  Cassell, 2020 WL 2112374, at *9 (“The purpose of shopping is . . . to purchase necessary 
items and then leave as soon as possible.”). 
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“Shoppers, particularly in the current environment, enter a store, 
gather the items they need as quickly as possible, check out, and 
promptly leave.”136 Worship services are extended affairs. A usual 
Sunday Catholic Mass takes at least an hour, and other services can be 
even longer: one plaintiff church’s service lasted an hour and forty-five 
minutes.137 Thus, the answer to Justice Kavanaugh’s question, “Why 
can someone safely walk down a grocery store aisle but not a pew?”138 
is that they can but do not: people sit in pews, not walk down them.139  
Second, people in stores generally try to minimize their 
interactions as much as possible, a feat made easier by the ability to 
constantly move around.140 In contrast, the point of in-person religious 
services is to commune with one’s fellow worshippers.141 Even when 
social distancing, congregants are still in an open room, perhaps with 
questionable ventilation, filled with people in front of them, in back of 
them, and to the sides of them. It is not surprising, then, that in its 
Guidance for Governors, the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of 
Public Health rated the contact intensity of shopping as low and the 
contact intensity of places of worship as high.142 
 
 136.  Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, No. 1:20-cv-00156-NT, 2020 WL 2310913, at *8 (D. 
Me. May 9, 2020). 
 137.  Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, No. 20 C 2782, 2020 WL 2468194, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. May 13, 2020) (“[L]ast Sunday’s service . . . was one hour, forty-seven minutes long, 
with virtually no one in the congregation or clergy wearing a face covering.”), aff’d, 962 F.3d 341 
(7th Cir. 2020); see also Calvary Chapel, 2020 WL 2310913, at *8 (“In contrast, the Plaintiff seeks 
to hold worship service for ‘no more than a few hours twice per week.’”). 
 138.  S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Roberts v. Neace, 958 
F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2020)).  
 139.  A similar rebuttal answers Justice Kavanaugh’s question, “[w]hy can someone safely 
interact with a brave deliverywoman but not with a stoic minister?” Id. Customers interact briefly 
or not at all with people delivering goods to their home, which is not the case with worshippers 
and their clergy. Also, people at church interact with all the other congregants as well as the 
clergy.  
 140.  Cassell, 2020 WL 2112374, at *9 (“The purpose of shopping is not to gather with others 
or engage them in conversation and fellowship . . . .”). 
 141.  Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, No. 3:20-cv-00033-GFVT, 2020 WL 1909616, 
at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 18, 2020) (noting that “the purpose of community-centered religious 
organizations” is “to congregate and converse”).  
 142.  JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH PRINCIPALS 
FOR A PHASED RE-OPENING DURING COVID-19: GUIDANCE FOR GOVERNORS 12, 16 (Apr. 17, 
2020), https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_archive/pubs-pdfs/2020/200417-
reopening-guidance-governors.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ2A-WDNW]. The Guide also rated 
worship services as “high” in number of contacts, compared to “medium” for retail. Id.  
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Moreover, the fellow worshippers surrounding them are speaking 
and even singing for an extended period of time.143 Such an experience, 
with the accompanying exposure to droplets and aerosols potentially 
carrying the virus, makes it a particularly high risk activity.144 And this 
is assuming that the church would forgo the communal sharing of food 
and wine that marks many services, although whether they do would 
be difficult to police. In sum, “[c]asual contact (briefly passing someone 
in the aisle of a big box store[)] entails a much smaller risk of 
contracting Covid-19 than a group congregating near one another for 
a longer period.”145  
Notably, many of the same factors that make gathering to worship 
dangerous may also make gathering at professional businesses 
dangerous, especially in open plan offices where many people work all 
day in a single room.146 A large meeting with many people discussing 
or celebrating next quarter’s projections can be just as conducive to 
contagion as a large gathering with people discussing or celebrating the 
Bible.147 As the Sixth Circuit fairly asked, “How are in-person meetings 
with social distancing any different from in-person church services with 
social distancing?”148  
Although exemptions for professional firms do weaken the claim 
of general applicability for those emergency orders that have them, 
such exemptions do not preclude general applicability. There may be 
other ways to distinguish the two, such as the argument that unlike 
religious services, legal and financial services cannot move entirely 
 
 143.  Cassell, 2020 WL 2112374, at *9 (“Given that religious gatherings seek to promote 
conversation and fellowship, they ‘endanger’ the government’s interest in fighting COVID-19 to 
a ‘greater degree’ than the secular businesses Plaintiffs identify.”). 
 144.  In a chart created by highly credentialed healthcare experts, attending church in person 
was listed as a “high risk” activity. Working in an office was “medium/high risk” while retail 
shopping was “low/medium risk.” What is low risk? Staying at home; running or biking; picking 
up take-out. COVID-19 Activity Risk Levels, EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL (June 30, 2020), 
http://www.ezekielemanuel.com/writing/all-articles/2020/06/30/covid-19-activity-risk-levels 
[https://perma.cc/H648-46B5]. 
 145.  Antietam Battlefield KOA v. Hogan, No. CCB-20-1130, 2020 WL 2556496, at *8 (D. 
Md. May 20, 2020); see also Spell v. Edwards, No. CV 20-00282, 2020 WL 2509078, at *3 (M.D. 
La. May 15, 2020) (“[T]he transient, in-and-out nature of consumer interaction with businesses, 
like those identified by the Plaintiff, are markedly different from the extended, more densely 
packed environments of churches . . . .”), vacated as moot, 962 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 146.  That was, after all, the configuration of the Korean call center. See supra note 133. 
 147.  Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2020) (“It’s not as if law firm office 
meetings . . . always take less time than worship services.”); Woodward, supra note 133 
(describing the risk of poorly ventilated offices).  
 148.  Roberts, 958 F.3d at 415. 
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online.149 Or the argument may be that while worship services 
necessarily involve large indoor gatherings, legal and accounting 
services do not. Professional firms may be small, and they are more 
likely to have individual offices than open floor plans. Furthermore, 
they usually provide their professional services without large meetings. 
After noting, “Plaintiffs also complain that the Order classifies law and 
accounting firms as essential, with no ten-person limit, suggesting that 
this somehow shows that the Order targets religion,” one federal court 
responded, “Again, however, people do not go to those places to 
gather in groups for hours at a time.”150  
Nonetheless, general applicability does not ultimately depend on 
the persuasiveness of these distinctions.151 Instead, the argument may 
be that one or two exceptions to an order should not automatically 
disqualify it from being neutral and generally applicable, especially 
when the vast majority of gatherings are still banned. As mentioned 
above, the Lukumi Court has acknowledged that nearly all laws are 
underinclusive to some degree, whether they be federal anti-drug laws 
or executive orders meant to slow down the spread of a pandemic.152 
The rule that a single secular exemption automatically triggers strict 
scrutiny is an arguably untenable proposition that would make every 
religious objector “a law unto himself.”153  
*   *   * 
 
 149.  Filing a legal brief, for example, requires printing, photocopying, tabs, and special 
stationary. They also often include elaborate and detailed documentary submissions. And while 
some courts allow online submissions, not all do. The Courts of Appeals will accept online briefs 
initially, but hard copies in triplicate need to be submitted soon after. Or at the trial level, 
responding to document requests may require printing out thousands of pages. 
 150.  Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, No. 20 C 2782, 2020 WL 2468194, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. May 13, 2020), aff’d, 962 F.3d 341 (7th Cir. 2020).  
 151.  It does, however, make it easier to satisfy general applicability if there is no secular 
counterpart that is exempted. It may be for this reason that California’s most recent order puts 
worship services and offices that are not part of critical infrastructure in the same category. See 
supra note 9. According to California, critical infrastructure includes things like emergency 
services, healthcare, energy, water, dams, transportation, information technology, critical 
manufacturing, etc. CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, ESSENTIAL WORKFORCE (2020), 
https://covid19.ca.gov/img/EssentialCriticalInfrastructureWorkers.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QXZ-
BYB6].  
 152.  See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  
 153.  Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (“To permit this would be to make the 
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every 
citizen to become a law unto himself.”); Colin A. Devine, A Critique of the Secular Exceptions 
Approach to Religious Exemptions, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1348, 1352 (2015) (“If religious exemptions 
must be granted from any law with secular exceptions, they will be granted from nearly every 
law.”). 
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The current science suggests that crowded indoor spots where 
people talk, sing, and socialize for an extended period of time are high 
risk and potential “super-spreader events.”154 While that generally 
does not describe people at their local supermarket or even liquor 
store, it does describe religious services. The bottom line, then, is that 
mass gatherings and shopping are not analogous in terms of risk. 
Accordingly, disparate treatment of these dissimilar activities does not 
indicate discrimination or defeat general applicability.  
III. STRICT SCRUTINY  
Even if not considered neutral and generally applicable, the bans 
on gatherings over a certain size will still pass constitutional muster if 
they survive strict scrutiny. A law passes strict scrutiny if its goal is 
compelling and the means used narrowly tailored.155 A law is narrowly 
tailored if there is not an alternative, equally effective way to 
accomplish the government’s goal that infringes less on religious 
liberty.156  
There is no goal more compelling than promoting health and 
safety, generally, and saving lives, particularly. Few dispute that these 
orders are motivated by a state interest of the highest magnitude.157 
“[N]o one contests that [governors have] a compelling government 
interest in preventing the spread of a novel, highly contagious, 
sometimes fatal virus.”158 
 
 154.  Aylin Woodward, Trump Declared Houses of Worship Essential. Mounting Evidence 
Shows They’re Super-Spreader Hotspots, BUS. INSIDER INDIA (May 31, 2020, 11:20 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.in/science/news/trump-just-declared-houses-of-worship-essential-
mounting-evidence-shows-theyre-super-spreader-hotspots-/articleshow/75907337.cms 
[https://perma.cc/JR8E-2DV4] (“[Super-spreader] events have shared a few key characteristics: 
They’ve mostly been indoors and puts lots of people from different households in close, extended 
contact. That’s precisely the type of gathering that churches, mosques, and synagogues 
facilitate.”). 
 155.  Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2260 (2020) (“To satisfy [strict 
scrutiny], government action ‘must advance “interests of the highest order” and must be narrowly 
tailored in pursuit of those interests.’”). 
 156.  Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 847 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(defining a law passing strict scrutiny as “‘narrowly tailored’ to further a “compelling interest,” 
without there being a ‘less restrictive’ alternative that would be ‘at least as effective’”)).  
 157.  Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, No. 3:20-cv-278-DJH, 2020 WL 1909616, at 
*3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 18, 2020) (“Plaintiffs do not contend that the Commonwealth lacks a 
compelling governmental interest in restricting mass gatherings to prevent the spread of COVID-
19.”). 
 158.  Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 2020); see also S. Bay United Pentecostal 
Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1614 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“California 
undoubtedly has a compelling interest in combating the spread of COVID-19 and protecting the 
health of its citizens.”). 
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The strict scrutiny analysis turns instead on whether the state can 
persuade the court that it cannot achieve its life-saving mission without 
restricting large religious gatherings. Evaluating tailoring is more of an 
art than science, and even with strict scrutiny, courts have some 
discretion. Two factors might influence a court’s analysis. First, the 
strictness of a court’s application may depend on its assessment of the 
gravity of the pandemic.159 The more compelling the government’s 
goal, the less demanding the court may be (consciously or 
unconsciously) with regard to fit.160 Thus, those courts focused on the 
deadliness of the pandemic, and high risk of super-spreader events, 
may prove more willing than usual to find that the state has made its 
showing.161 For example, in upholding California’s ban, the Ninth 
Circuit observed, “We’re dealing here with a highly contagious and 
often fatal disease for which there presently is no known cure.”162  
The second factor is whether a court finds that there are 
exemptions for activities with parallel risks, underscoring how critical 
this question is for the overall analysis. In fact, courts that believe that 
restricted worship services are more analogous to essential services 
exempted from the ban have concluded that the ban’s goals could 
therefore be readily achieved with one more exemption.163 Thus, the 
Sixth Circuit ruled that “[t]here are plenty of less restrictive ways to 
address these public-health issues. Why not insist that the congregants 
adhere to social-distancing and other health requirements and leave it 
 
 159.  See, e.g., Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, No. 2:20cv204, 2020 WL 2110416, 
at *16 (E.D. Va. May 1, 2020) (“The equities, in the context of a deadly pandemic, tip in 
Defendant’s favor.”). 
 160.  It is not so much that courts are applying Jacobson sub rosa, see supra Part I, but that 
courts may prove more deferential when evaluating what they perceive as an emergency situation.  
 161.  See, e.g., Maryville Baptist Church, 2020 WL 1909616, at *3 (“Given that COVID-19 is 
widely understood to be transmitted through person-to-person contact, including persons with 
and without symptoms of illness, Beshear will likely be able to demonstrate that restricting large 
in-person gatherings is the least restrictive means of accomplishing the Commonwealth’s 
objective.”); Roberts, 2020 WL 2115358, at *4 (“This Court agrees [that the church has failed to 
demonstrate a likelihood of success]. The current public health crisis presents life-or-death 
dangers.”). 
 162.  S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 959 F.3d 938, 939 (9th Cir. 2020). The 
Ninth Circuit added, “In the words of Justice Robert Jackson, if a ‘[c]ourt does not temper its 
doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into 
a suicide pact.’” Id.  
 163.  First Baptist Church v. Kelly, No. 20-1102-JWB, 2020 WL 1910021, at *8 (D. Kan. Apr. 
18, 2020) (“Plaintiffs can likely show that the broad prohibition against in-person religious 
services of more than ten congregants is not narrowly tailored to achieve the stated public health 
goals where the comparable secular gatherings are subjected to much less restrictive 
conditions.”). 
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at that—just as the Governor has done for comparable secular 
activities?”164  
In addition to the fact that multiple outbreaks have been traced to 
church gatherings, the scientific knowledge at this time supports 
upholding the application of mass gathering bans to houses of worship. 
The best available evidence points to large indoor gatherings with 
extended interactions, especially those that involve speaking and 
singing, as major vectors of contagion. Consequently, gatherings that 
fit that profile ought to be curtailed, even if they do sweep in religious 
services. As one court noted: “Every gathering of more than ten people 
endangers health and life and increases the burden on the frontline 
healthcare workers tasked with caring for those afflicted.”165  
CONCLUSION  
Bans on all mass gatherings, including religious ones, are both 
sensible and constitutional in the midst of a pandemic. Indeed, in 
rejecting a religious liberty challenge to a child welfare law in 1944, the 
Supreme Court noted, “The right to practice religion freely does not 
include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable 
disease or the latter to ill health or death.”166 That sentiment still holds 
true today. Our constitutional rights are precious, but none of them are 
absolute.167 Even the right to religious liberty is not absolute, especially 
if exercising it endangers others. “After all, without life, there can be 
no liberty or pursuit of happiness.”168 
 
 
 164.  Roberts, 958 F.3d at 415. Of course, this argument turns on whether the activities are in 
fact comparable.  
 165.  Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, No. 2:20cv204, 2020 WL 2110416, at *16 
(E.D. Va. May 1, 2020). 
 166.  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944). 
 167.  Lighthouse Fellowship Church, 2020 WL 2110416, at *17 (“[T]he libert[ies] secured by 
the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an 
absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly free from 
restraint.” (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905))). 
 168.  Cassell v. Snyders, No. 20 C 50153, 2020 WL 2112374, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2020). 
